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INTRODUCTION
Almost three years ago, the National Football League (“NFL”
or “League”) team owners voted unanimously to opt out of the
current NFL collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)1 between
the NFL’s management2 and the NFL’s players3 following the
2010 season.4 The opt-out has created the need for negotiation of a
new CBA between the NFL’s management and the NFL’s players

1
A Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) is a trade agreement between an
employer and the representative(s) of a unit of employees (usually a union), that governs
hiring, work, pay and dispute resolution. See J.I. Case Co. v. Labor Bd., 321 U.S. 332,
334–35 (1944).
2
The NFL’s management includes the NFL team owners, the NFL commissioner, and
other NFL executives.
3
The NFL players include the individual NFL players and the NFL players’ union,
the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”).
4
See Michael Silver, Fans’ Guide to NFL Labor Battle, YAHOO!SPORTS (Sept. 8,
2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=ms-laborquestions090810.
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and has set the stage for a labor dispute that has threatened the
League’s first work stoppage5 since 1987.6
On September 30, 2010, the Associated Press received a copy
of a letter sent by the president of the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”),
Richard Trumka, to the NFL commissioner, Roger Goodell, and
the executive director of the National Football League Players
Association (“NFLPA” or “Union”), DeMaurice Smith.7 In this
letter, Trumka offered on behalf of the AFL-CIO to mediate the
NFL’s CBA negotiations in the hope that it would help bring about
a resolution to the ongoing labor dispute between the NFL’s
management and players.8
The NFL’s management rejected Trumka’s offer,9 citing the
potential for unfair bias against the NFL’s management in any
AFL-CIO conducted mediation.10 The Union took a different
position.11 NFLPA spokesman, George Atallah, wrote in an email, “We welcome the AFL-CIO’s initiative and accept Mr.
Trumka’s invitation.”12
While the current CBA is set to expire in March 2011, the two
sides remain far apart in reaching a new CBA.13 The crucial
sticking point in reaching a new CBA is the revenue percentage
that the League should distribute to the players at the end of each
5

A work stoppage occurs when there is either a lockout or a strike. Labor Pains,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/news/2002/05/25/work_
stopppages (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). A lockout occurs when, during labor
negotiations, an employer attempts to put economic pressure on employees by refusing to
allow them to work. Robert H. Lattinville, et al., Labor Pain: The Effect of a Work
Stoppage in the NFL on its Coaches, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 335, 337 (2010). A strike
occurs when employees refuse to perform work for their employer in support of a
bargaining position or in protest of some aspect of a previous labor agreement. Id.
6
See Silver, supra note 4.
7
See AFL-CIO Prez Offers Help to NFL, NFLPA, ESPN (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://sports. espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5633268 [hereinafter AFL-CIO Prez].
8
See id.
9
Id.
10
Id. (explaining that the NFLPA is a member of the AFL-CIO and that Mr. Smith sits
on the AFL-CIO’s board).
11
See id.
12
Id.
13
See NFL Owners to Meet March 3—The Day the CBA Expires, TSN,
http://www.tsn.ca/nfl/story/?id=353883&asid=b5a23735 (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
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season.14 Under the most recent CBA, which was implemented in
2006, the players received 59.6% of designated League revenues.15
League owners say that if the League wants to remain profitable,
that number must be decreased.16 The Union has refused to
consider negotiating this decrease without proof of the League’s
financial hardship—something the League has been unwilling to
offer.17 Labor talks have also been made more difficult because
Goodell and Smith are conducting their first CBA negotiations as
leaders of their respective organizations.18
The current NFL labor dispute and potential work stoppage
could delay, or even worse, result in the cancellation of the 2011–
2012 NFL season.19 A season-long work stoppage could “cost
thousands of Americans their jobs and cities more than $140
million in revenue.”20 It could also cost the League $1 billion in
lost revenue.21 As the NFL labor dispute highlights, labor disputes
can be detrimental not only to professional sports leagues, but to
national economies as well.
This Note uses the current labor dispute between the NFL’s
management and the NFL’s players as an example of how properly
conducted mediation can help to resolve labor disputes between
management and players in professional sports leagues. A
collaborative approach to resolving this labor dispute is essential
for NFL players and owners, who depend on one another for
financial success. The NFL should be capable of resolving this
dispute efficiently, effectively, and in a manner that strengthens
relationships amongst the players, the owners, the League’s
business partners, and the NFL’s fans.
14

Silver, supra note 4.
Id.
16
AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7 (stating that huge debts from building stadiums and
starting the NFL television network make it impossible to stay profitable).
17
Id.
18
Michael J. Redding & Daniel R. Peterson, Third and Long: The Issues Facing the
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Negotiations and the Effects of an Uncapped
Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 97 (2009).
19
See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7.
20
Id.
21
Barry Wilner, Lockout Could Cost NFL $1-Billion, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/football/lockout-could-cost-nfl-1-billion/
article1755865/?cmpid=rss1 [hereinafter Wilner, Lockout].
15
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Part I of this Note defines alternative dispute resolution
(“ADR”) and discusses how ADR has been utilized to resolve
labor disputes in professional sports. Part II of this Note covers the
legal and factual background behind the NFL dispute. It discusses
the history of labor relations within the four major United States
professional sports leagues,22 with an emphasis on the evolution of
labor relations and collective bargaining between the NFL’s
management and the NFLPA. Part III summarizes the current
NFL labor dispute, with a breakdown of the NFL management’s
and the NFLPA’s respective positions on the critical components
of the next NFL CBA. Part IV of this Note explains the ways in
which mediation can help resolve the labor clash between the
NFL’s management and the NFLPA so that a new CBA can be
agreed upon before a work stoppage occurs. Lastly, Part V
proposes specific mediation guidelines that could help these
parties, and potentially other professional sports leagues with
similar disputes, reach an agreement on a new CBA. This proposal
recognizes “the significance of the bargaining history between the
parties as well as the unique nature of the professional sports
industry.”23
I. THE OPENING KICK: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
SPORTS
Alternative dispute resolution is a method of using extrajudicial
means, including arbitration and mediation, to resolve disputes.24
It has been successfully used to resolve conflicts in a wide range of
fields.25

22

The four major United States professional sports leagues include Major League
Baseball (“MLB”), the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), the National Hockey
League (“NHL”), and the NFL. See Matt Cutler, Big Four U.S. Sports Enjoy Sponsorship
Hike, SPORTSBUS. (Nov. 19, 2010, 9:25 AM), http://www.sportbusiness.com/
news/182615/big-four-us-sports-enjoy-sponsorship-hike.
23
Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 339, 343.
24
2009 Annual Survey: Recent Developments in Sports Law, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
497, 498 (2009).
25
These include disputes involving employment, intellectual property, consumer,
technology, health care, financial services, construction, and international trade conflicts.
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Arbitration is a contractually agreed upon alternative to
litigation in the event of a legal dispute.26 It is a process whereby
the parties to a contract present their side of a legal dispute to “one
or more impartial persons— “arbitrators”—for a final and binding
decision, known as an ‘award.’”27 Awards are issued through
written decision by an arbitrator and are prohibitively difficult to
overturn.28 The reasons contracting parties normally prefer
arbitration to litigation is that it is time-effective, cost-effective,
informal, confidential, and binding.29
Mediation occurs when two or more disputing parties have
been unable to resolve a conflict.30 The parties use an impartial
third party—a “mediator”—who lacks authority to force a
settlement, to help them negotiate a settlement of their own
creation.31 The mediator is often an expert in the legal area or
industry in which the dispute occurs.32 Mediation is ideal for those
who want to participate in “determining the outcome of a dispute
because it provides an opportunity for parties . . . to work through
issues with the assistance of an impartial third person trained to
facilitate resolution.”33 Similar to arbitration, mediation is often
preferable to litigation because it is time-effective, cost-effective,

See Dispute Resolution Services, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/drs (last
visited Nov. 12, 2010).
26
Arbitration, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://adr.org/sp.asp?id=28749 (last visited
Nov. 12, 2010).
27
Id.
28
Martin J. Greenberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Sports Facility Leases, 16
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 99, 102 (2005) [hereinafter Greenberg, Sports Facility Leases];
see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010) (“It
is only when an arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and
effectively dispenses his own brand of industrial justice that his decision may be
unenforceable.” (quoting Major League Baseball Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509
(2001))).
29
See Greenberg, Sports Facility Leases, supra note 28, at 101.
30
What is Mediation?, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.aaamediation.com/faces/
index.jspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
31
Id.
32
See Cheryl Cutrona, Considering Mediation? Looking for a Mediator? Some
Information to Help You Select a Mediator, PA. COUNCIL OF MEDIATORS, http://www.
pamediation.org/archives/How_to_Select_a_Mediator.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
33
What is Mediation?, supra note 30.
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informal, and confidential.34 It is also important to note that
“mediation is prospective rather than retrospective”;35 instead of
analyzing the parties’ past relationship, mediation tries to resolve
how the parties can work together in the future to achieve common
gains.36
Given the unique characteristics of the twenty-first century
sports industry, it is not surprising that alternative dispute
resolution has become the predominant mechanism by which
disputes get resolved within professional sports leagues.37
Whereas the litigation process usually becomes protracted, in
sports business, disputes must often be resolved quickly.38
Alternative dispute resolution provides the sports industry with an
effective means for fast and reliable dispute resolution. Moreover,
because of the confidential nature of alternative dispute resolution,
very little information is communicated to the public regarding the
dispute.39 “This is particularly valuable to an industry which on
the one hand, is very conscious of its public image and, on the
other hand, is subjected to the constant probing of the news
media.”40
Today, most CBAs between a professional sports league and a
players’ union include a provision mandating arbitration in the
case of certain types of disputes.41 Such disputes typically involve
issues such as “injury grievances, employment grievances, and
players’ salary arbitration.”42 Arbitration has also been used to
resolve disputes over sports facility leases and the administration
of “franchise, joint-venture, and partnership disputes . . . such as
34
See Benefits of Mediation, MEDIATE, http://www.mediate.com/articles/benefits.cfm
(last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
35
What is Mediation?, supra note 30.
36
Id.
37
See Greenberg, Sports Facility Leases, supra note 28, at 100 (quoting MARTIN J.
GREENBERG, THE STADIUM GAME 532 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter GREENBERG, STADIUM
GAME]).
38
See id. at 101.
39
See id. at 101–02.
40
See id. at 102 (quoting MARTIN J. GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 73 (1993)
[hereinafter GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW]).
41
See id. at 100 (quoting Sports Arbitration Including Olympic Athlete Disputes, AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22022 (last visited Nov. 14, 2005)).
42
Id.
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disputes over partnership proceeds, termination of sports
executives, the sale of a franchise, and payments under executive
or partnership agreements.”43
Mediation has also played a crucial role in resolving major
disputes in professional sports. Cases have involved conflicts
regarding facility cost,44 coach compensation,45 league television
broadcast rights,46 and team ownership rights.47 Mediation has
been integral in helping leagues and player unions reach
agreements during the collective bargaining process as well.48
II. PLAYING BALL: LABOR RELATIONS IN UNITED STATES
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
Labor relations in the four major United States professional
sports leagues have been notoriously contentious since the creation
of the first of the four major professional sports leagues during the
“Robber Barron” era.49 Starting with the inception of professional

43

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., District of Columbia, MLB Reach Revised Agreement, ESPN (Jan. 27,
2006, 7:52 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2308920 (discussing a
revised lease for a Washington Nationals baseball stadium).
45
See, e.g., Cuban-Nelson Dispute Headed to Mediation, CBS SPORTS,
http://www.cbssports.com/nba/story/11310151 (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (discussing
former coach Don Nelson’s compensation package).
46
See, e.g., John Ourand, NFL Network, Comcast Hold Mediation Meetings Over
Carriage, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Aug. 6, 2008),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/123010 (discussing the carriage dispute
between Comcast and the NFL Network).
47
See Greg Risling, McCourt Divorce Trial: Mediation Scheduled for Friday,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sep. 22, 2010, 8:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/09/22/mccourt-divorce-trial-med_n_734827.html.
48
See Liz Mullen, Sports Labor is Familiar Ground for Mediator, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 15, 2010, at 40.
49
See Ethan M. Lewis, “A Structure To Last Forever”: The Players’ League and The
Brotherhood War of 1890, ETHANLEWIS.ORG, http://www.ethanlewis.org/pl/ch2.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2010). A robber baron is “an American capitalist of the latter part of the
19th century who became wealthy through exploitation (as of natural resources,
governmental influence, or low wage scales).” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1077 (11th ed. 2003), available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/robber%20baron. The robber barons created monopolies, and the
Sherman Act was enacted “as a response to the growth of monopolies that threatened to
destroy competition in the marketplace.” Lawrence M. Salinger, Introduction to
44
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baseball in 1871 when the National Association of Professional
Base Ball Players was formed, professional baseball was initially a
player-controlled enterprise.50 However, this changed when the
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs (“National
League”)51 was founded in 1876.52 The founders of the National
League considered it to be a “league of ball club owners, to whom
the players were only employees.”53
To help implement their vision of organized professional
baseball, National League team owners created the “reserve
clause” system.54 This clause quickly became a part of every
player contract that each individual player signed when joining a
team and stated that upon the expiration of any player’s contract,
the rights to the player were retained by the team to which he
signed.55 Essentially, this meant that although both the player’s
obligation to play for the team and the team’s obligation to pay the
player had ended, the player could never enter a contract with
another team.56 Thus, the player was forced to negotiate a new
contract with the same team, request a trade, or quit playing
professional baseball.57 If the player refused to honor his existing
contract due to the contract’s terms, he was blacklisted.58 The
reserve clause system represented an act of collusion by the owners
and laid the ground work for a monopoly.59 Professional baseball

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME, at ix (Lawrence M. Salinger ed.,
2005).
50
See Lewis, supra note 49.
51
See Michael J. Haupert, The Economic History of Major League Baseball, EH.NET
(Feb. 1, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/haupert.mlb. The National
League was the older of two professional baseball leagues that would ultimately combine
to form Major League Baseball (“MLB”). Id.
52
See Lewis, supra note 49.
53
Id.
54
See id.
55
See id. The NFL, NBA, and NHL also adopted the reserve system or some variation
of it. See Jonathan B. Goldberg, Player Mobility in Professional Sports: From the
Reserve System to Free Agency, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 21, 22–25 (2008).
56
See Lewis, supra note 49.
57
Id.
58
This meant that all National League team owners collectively agreed not to offer the
player a new contract. See id.
59
See id.
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players did not have a strong union during the nineteenth century,
and as a result, did little to challenge the clause.60
As professional baseball entered the twentieth century,
National League owners increasingly imposed their will on
National League players. Team owners had complete financial
control over the players on their respective teams, with no realistic
possibility of competition for player services from elsewhere.61
Whatever competition for signing players existed from other
leagues was thwarted by the National League, either by way of
crushing it with superior financial might or by merger.62 This was
most evident in 1903 when the American League merged with the
National League to form what eventually became Major League
Baseball (“MLB”).63 This agreement also tied independent
contracts (those contracts that were not previously National League
contracts) to the National League reserve clause system.64
A. Changing the Rules of the Game: Antitrust Law
While team owners consolidated power over the players,
important legislation was making its way through Congress that
would not only severely impact labor relations in professional
baseball, but ultimately, labor relations in the remainder of the four
major United States professional sports leagues.
In response to the “Robber Baron” era, Congress developed
antitrust law to promote competition between companies involved
in interstate commerce. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (the
“Sherman Act”) “preserves ‘free and unfettered competition’ in the
marketplace, which ‘will yield the best allocation of economic
60

See History of the Major League Baseball Players Association, MLBPLAYERS.COM,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp (last visited Nov. 5, 2010) (“Opposed to
baseball’s reserve clause and a growing movement led by Albert Spalding to cap players’
salaries, John Montgomery Ward and eight other players in 1885 formed the first players
union in baseball—the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players. . . . None of those
efforts proved sufficient in bringing an end to the reserve clause, which bound players to
their respective clubs.”).
61
Id.
62
See Haupert, supra note 51 (discussing the National League’s buyout deal with the
Player’s League and merger with the American Association).
63
See id.
64
See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 41.
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resources of the country, the lowest prices, the highest quality and
greatest material progress.’”65 Section 1 of the Sherman Act is
designed to prohibit contracts, combinations or conspiracies that
unreasonably restrain trade.66
Section 2 prohibits
67
monopolization.
Violations of Section 1 have been found to include horizontal
price fixing,68 market allocations,69 and group boycotts.70 These
Section 1 violations are deemed per se illegal under the Sherman
Act because “their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming value are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.”71
Other restraints of trade are analyzed under the “Supreme Court’s
‘rule of reason’ [test], which weighs the procompetitive benefits
and the anticompetitive effects of an agreement in order to
determine whether it should survive antitrust scrutiny.”72
In order to commit a Section 2 violation, an entity must both
possess monopoly power and engage in anticompetitive conduct.73
65

Goldberg, supra note 55, at 27 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 4 (1958) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
67
See id. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment
not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.”).
68
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940). Horizontal
Price Fixing refers to an agreement between two or more parties, generally considered to
be competitors, to set, maintain, and charge a specified price for a particular product. See
id. at 213.
69
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). Market allocations
are agreements in which competitors divide markets among themselves either by types of
customers, products, or territories. See id.
70
Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941) (citing
E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609–11 (1914)).
A group boycott is a type of boycott in which two or more competitors in a relevant
market refuse to conduct business with a firm. See id. at 461.
71
See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 28 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
72
Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
73
See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (“Use of
monopoly power ‘to destroy threatened competition’ is a violation of the ‘attempt to
monopolize’ clause of § 2 of the Sherman Act. So are agreements not to compete, with
the aim of preserving or extending a monopoly.” (citations omitted)).
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Monopoly power is often demonstrated by showing that the
challenged entity has significant market share and has engaged in
exclusionary behavior without a valid business reason.74
B. Antitrust Law and its Impact on the Four Major United States
Professional Sports Leagues
Initially, MLB was granted an antitrust exemption.75 In
American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase,76 the New
York State Supreme Court held:
It is apparent from the analysis already set forth . . .
that a monopoly of baseball as a business has been
ingeniously devised and created in so far as a
monopoly can be created among free men; but I
cannot agree to the proposition that the business of
baseball for profit is interstate trade or commerce,
and therefore subject to the provisions of the
Sherman Act.77
The United States Supreme Court reinforced the New York
Supreme Court’s holding when in Federal Base Ball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League,78 it held that the National
League was not subject to the Sherman Act “because major league
baseball was not interstate commerce.”79 The Court stated that
“the ‘business of giving exhibitions’ was ‘purely state affairs,’ and
thus not interstate in nature.”80
The United States Supreme Court revisited the Federal Base
Ball Club precedent in 1953.81 In Toolson v. New York Yankees,82
74

Id. at 377, 388.
See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 29 (explaining that “baseball avoided antitrust
liability because courts held that the business of baseball was not interstate commerce”
(quoting Am. League Baseball Club of Chi. v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1914))).
76
149 N.Y.S. 6, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914).
77
See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 29 (quoting Am. League Baseball Club of Chi., 149
N.Y.S. at 16).
78
259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).
79
See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 29 (citing Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l
League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922)).
80
Id. (quoting Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt., 259 U.S. at 208).
81
See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
75
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the Court found that because Congress had not acted during the
thirty years since Federal Base Ball Club to make professional
baseball subject to antitrust law, Congress implicitly agreed with
the Supreme Court’s earlier finding that antitrust law does not
apply to the business of professional baseball.83 Accordingly, the
court held, reserve clauses in player contracts were valid,
regardless of their monopolistic tendencies.84
In 1972, MLB’s antitrust exemption was once again challenged
in Flood v. Kuhn.85 After reviewing both Federal Base Ball Club
and Toolson, the Court held that baseball’s reserve clause system
enjoyed exemption from antitrust law, which made it “an exception
and an anomaly.”86 However, while the Court recognized the
incongruity of this past precedent with federal antitrust law, it
refused to disturb its precedent, leaving it for Congress to remedy
the situation.87 Congress eventually did so in 1988 with the
passage of the Curt Flood Act which significantly limited MLB’s
antitrust exemption.88
To this day, no other major United States professional sports
league has ever received a federal antitrust exemption. In
Radovich v. NFL,89 a professional football player brought an
antitrust suit against the NFL alleging violations of Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act.90 The NFL argued that because professional
baseball was exempt from federal antitrust law, professional
football should be exempt as well.91 The Supreme Court, however,
decided to limit the exemption to organized professional

82

346 U.S. 356 (1953).
See id. at 357.
84
Id.; see supra notes 48–56 and accompanying text.
85
407 U.S. 258 (1972).
86
Goldberg, supra note 55, at 31 (citing Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt., 259 U.S. at 282).
87
See id.
88
See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–297, § 2, 112 Stat. 2824. The Curt
Flood Act’s purpose was to remove Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption, but it
largely reaffirmed it. See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 31.
89
352 U.S. 445, 446 (1957).
90
Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 446–47 (1957).
91
Id. at 449–50.
83
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baseball.92 Following the Radovich precedent, district courts went
on to hold that the National Hockey League (“NHL”) and the
National Basketball Association (“NBA”) were subject to federal
antitrust law.93 The holding of Radovich was recently reinforced
when the Supreme Court found that the NFL’s licensing activities
are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.94
C. Labor Law, Labor Unions, and the Labor Exemption
Unlike MLB, the players in the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL
have always been able to challenge the reserve system and other
anticompetitive league practices under federal antitrust law.95
However, an important subsequent development has effectively
allowed for league exemption from antitrust liability in most
cases.96 This has occurred because players in all four of the major
United States professional sports leagues “unionize[d] and
designate[d] representatives of the players associations to negotiate
with team owners.”97
The National Labor Relations Act grants employees the right to
self-organize and to bargain collectively with their employer.98 If
employees elect a labor union to represent them, they lose their
right to bargain individually.99 By joining their economic strength
and acting through a labor union, employees have the best chance
of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours and working

92

See id. at 451–52 (confining the scope of the antitrust exemption because the
business of baseball fell “outside the scope of the [Sherman] Act” and not other
businesses as well).
93
See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 30–31 (citing Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).
94
See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130, S. Ct. 2201, 2206–07 (2010).
95
See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 31.
96
See generally Jeffrey Hoffmeyer, Fourth Down and an Appeal: The Nonstatutory
Exemption to Antitrust Law in Clarett v. National Football League, 13 SPORTS LAW. J.
193 (2006) (discussing Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004)).
97
Id. at 199.
98
See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 93–360, 88 Stat. 395
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1974)).
99
See Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1971).
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conditions.100 However, as discussed above, Section 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits certain agreements which restrain trade in
interstate commerce.101 Labor unions, by their very nature, often
engage in trade restriction when they make agreements with
management for better working conditions.102 Therefore, to shield
unions from antitrust liability, a statutory “labor exemption” was
created under the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.103
This statutory labor exemption was later expanded by the
addition of a nonstatutory labor exemption.104 The nonstatutory
labor exemption is a judicially derived expansion of the statutory
labor exemption that protects good faith union-management
interaction from antitrust scrutiny.105 Thus, the Supreme Court has
explained that any term of a league-player union agreement that is
the product of arm’s-length negotiation (e.g., the terms of a league
CBA) will receive protection from antitrust law, regardless of the
agreement’s collusive or anticompetitive nature.106
D. The NFL
The NFL began operating in 1920107 and is an unincorporated
association comprised of member clubs which own and operate
professional football teams.108 Mainstream America began to
follow the NFL during Bert Bell’s tenure as League
Commissioner.109 However, “professional football truly began to
make strides with the rise of Commissioner Pete Rozelle.”110

100

See id. at 8 (quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)).
See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
102
See generally Goldberg, supra note 55, at 32 (“[L]abor and antitrust laws are in
conflict, as one promotes and the other discourages combinations . . . .”).
103
See Hoffmeyer, supra note 96, at 195–96.
104
Id. at 196 (citing United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)).
105
See id.
106
See Brown v. Prof’l Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235 (1996) (holding that the nonstatutory exemption is applicable to good-faith bargaining between the NFL and NFL
players).
107
See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976).
108
See id.
109
Jeffrey F. Levine & Bram A. Maravent, Fumbling Away the Season: Will the
Expiration of the NFL-NFLPA CBA Result in the Loss of the 2011 Season and Beyond?,
20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1419, 1426 (2010).
110
Id.
101
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Commissioner Rozelle developed the concept of “league think,” an
initiative aimed at convincing large market owners to “forego
lucrative local television contracts in favor of a deal that equally
benefited every franchise.”111 Over time, national television
contracts with NBC and CBS provided financial security for
member franchises.112 They also facilitated a business model that
allowed the NFL to promote “economic and competitive parity
amongst its clubs.”113 However, it was the NFL’s strongest
business competitor, the American Football League (“AFL”), that
first demonstrated the economic effectiveness of a cooperative
television plan for professional football.114
Interleague tensions peaked in 1966. After former AFL
Commissioner and current Oakland Raiders owner, Al Davis,
actively recruited players from NFL teams, the two leagues spent a
combined $7 million to sign their 1966 college draft choices.115
While Davis and other members of AFL management intended to
enhance interleague competition, some AFL and NFL owners saw
this volatile situation as detrimental to both leagues.116 As a result,
after a series of secret meetings between both sides, the AFL
merged to become a part of the NFL on June 8, 1966.117 Congress
approved the merger, passing legislation exempting the agreement
from antitrust scrutiny on October twenty-first of the same year.118
With that, the modern day NFL was born.

111

See id.
Id.
113
Id.
114
See id. at 1427.
115
See NFL, THE OFFICIAL 2010 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE RECORD AND FACT
BOOK 359 (2010) [hereinafter NFL], available at http://static.nfl.com/static/content/
public/image/history/pdfs/History/Chronology.pdf (stating that Al Davis became
Commissioner of the AFL in 1966 after the resignation of Commissioner Joe Foss); see
also B. Duane Cross, The AFL: A Football Legacy, CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 22,
2001, 2:57 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/news/2001/01/22/afl_history_2.
116
See Michael Schulze, How Al Davis Just Saved the NFL—Again, BLEACHER RPT.
(Feb. 27, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/131186-al-davis-just-saved-the-nflagain.
117
See NFL, supra note 115, at 359.
118
Id.
112
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E. The NFLPA: The Blitz on Ownership Begins
The formation of the NFLPA began at a meeting before the
start of the 1956 NFL Championship game.119 Annoyed that the
owners had rejected a player proposal that included a minimum
yearly player salary, a player per diem, and a rule requiring
payment of salary to injured players, the NFL players sought out
Creighton Miller120 to become their legal counsel.121 Eventually
players signed authorization cards which allowed Miller to become
their leader in 1956.122 For the first time in history, the NFL
players formed a united labor front, calling their organization the
“NFLPA.”123
NFL ownership initially refused to acknowledge the new
association.124 However, in 1957, Detroit Lions lineman Bill
Radovich brought suit under the Sherman Act, and as discussed
above, the Supreme Court held professional football to be subject
to antitrust law.125 As a result of the legal leverage that the players
gained over the owners from this decision, the owners had no
choice but to acknowledge the NFLPA and to agree to several of
the players’ earlier proposals.126
While the Radovich decision signaled a major victory for the
NFL players, the NFLPA remained in a precarious position due to
the 1966 merger of the AFL with the NFL.127 The NFLPA
represented the sixteen NFL teams that were a part of the NFL

119

See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 39.
Creighton Miller was the first general manager for the Cleveland Browns, a former
University of Notre Dame football player, and an attorney. See History: The Beginning—
1956, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited
Nov. 7, 2010).
121
See id.
122
See id.
123
See id. (“Their first meeting took place at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York in
November of 1956 . . . .”).
124
See id.
125
See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
126
See History: The Beginning—1956, supra note 120.
127
See Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1432 (stating that player solidarity
became a significant issue of concern for the Union in 1956).
120
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prior to the merger.128 However, after the merger, the ten
additional AFL teams that joined the NFL continued to be
represented by the American Football League Players Association
(“AFLPA”)129 rather than the NFLPA.130 Player unity became a
significant cause of concern.131
As the NFL players’ lack of harmony weakened their ability to
negotiate with the League, players sought help from the AFL-CIO
in creating a formal labor union.132 Although the AFL-CIO was
not interested in helping, the Teamsters Union was and wanted to
represent the players in collective bargaining with the League.133
Nevertheless, Creighton Miller refused to consider it.134 As a
result, a split occurred between the AFLPA and the NFLPA which
would significantly hurt the players, as it enabled the league to pit
one group against the other in its negotiation strategy.135
The NFL’s management refused to negotiate with the divided
players and also orchestrated an ownership lockout in 1968.136
This resulted in a short work stoppage.137 While this incident
ultimately produced the first NFL management-NFLPA CBA,138 it
was clear that the players’ lack of unity left them with less than
they had hoped for from the NFL’s management.139
The NFLPA turned a corner in 1970. After years of fighting
amongst the players, the AFLPA and the NFLPA merged, as

128

History: The 1960’s—AFL/NFL Competition, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N,
http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) [hereinafter
History: The 1960’s].
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
See History: The 1960’s, supra note 128.
133
See id. (“Bernie Parrish of the Cleveland Browns asked George Meany of the AFLCIO to help form a union of professional athletes.”).
134
Id.
135
See id.
136
Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 11.
137
History: The 1960’s, supra note 128.
138
Id.
139
Id.
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collective bargaining with the NFL owners loomed.140 John
Mackey of the Baltimore Colts was named NFLPA President.141
Owners were willing to negotiate a new collective bargaining
agreement with the newly formed union, but only if several
conditions were met.142 Among those conditions was that no
NFLPA or NFL lawyers, other than each party’s respective
General Counsel, be present at the negotiations.143 Despite the
potential for abuse of such a condition, the negotiations were
held.144 When Mackey arrived at the negotiations, he was greeted
by nine NFL attorneys.145 Mackey’s own attorney then proceeded
to advise Mackey to sign a document that would have resulted in
the NFLPA being bound to the owners’ offer “in perpetuity.”146
Realizing that he was being ambushed (and poorly counseled),
Mackey briefly suspended negotiations and sought the help of the
labor law firm, Lindquist & Vennum.147 The firm advised the
players to file a petition with the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) to become a recognized union.148
Player
representatives ultimately agreed and the NLRB granted
certification to the NFLPA.149
In addition to recommending that the players petition the
NLRB, Lindquist & Vennum assigned Ed Garvey to work with
Mackey.150 Strengthened by the newly formed union, the players
opted to challenge the most controversial labor issue between the
players and owners: the Rozelle Rule.151
140

History: The 1970’s—AFL and NFL Players Associations Merge, NFL PLAYERS
ASS’N, http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Nov. 7, 2010)
[hereinafter History: The 1970’s].
141
Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1433.
142
See History: The 1970’s, supra note 140.
143
See id.
144
See id.
145
See id.
146
Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1433.
147
See id. He also fired his attorney. Id.
148
See History: The 1970’s, supra note 140.
149
Id.
150
Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1433. Garvey ultimately left the firm and
became the Union’s first Executive Director. Id.
151
See C. Peter Goplerud III, Collective Bargaining in the National Football League: A
Historical and Comparative Analysis, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 16 (1997).
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F. “No Freedom, No Football”152: The Rozelle Rule and Mackey
v. NFL
The Rozelle Rule “allowed a player to change teams at the
conclusion of his contract if he could negotiate a new deal with a
new club; however, the new club was required to compensate the
old club for the loss of the player.”153 The two teams involved in
the player transaction were to determine the terms of
compensation, either in the form of players or cash.154 “If the
teams could not reach an agreement, the compensation was to be
set by [Commissioner Rozelle].”155 The apparent purpose and
effect of this rule was to limit free agency156 and player
movement.157 Commissioner Rozelle believed that “if players
were given complete freedom to negotiate their services, the
League would be dominated by a few rich teams and would
eventually lose both fan interest and revenue.”158
As a result of the Rozelle Rule, the first major NFL work
stoppage occurred in 1974.159 Outraged by the restrictions that the
Rozelle Rule placed on player services, the players went on a strike
that lasted forty-four days.160 However, the strike left the union
sharply divided, underfunded and unable to defeat the League’s
implementation of the Rozelle Rule.161 After another failed strike
attempt in 1975, the Union sought help from the court.162 The
result was Mackey v. NFL.163
In Mackey, Mackey and several other NFL players filed suit
against the League, claiming that the Rozelle Rule was an
152

“No Freedom, No Football” was the NFL players’ rallying cry as collective
bargaining with the owners began in 1974. See History: The 1970’s, supra note 140.
153
Goplerud, supra note 151, at 16.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
A “Free Agent” is a professional athlete who is “free to negotiate a contract with any
team.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 498 (11th ed. 2003), available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/free%20agent.
157
Goplerud, supra note 151, at 16.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1435.
163
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
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unreasonable restraint of trade and thus violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.164 Given the Supreme Court’s establishment of the
nonstatutory labor exemption, the Eighth Circuit used a three-part
test to determine when a management-player union agreement
would be granted a nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust
scrutiny:
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining
may potentially be given pre-eminence over the
antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily
affects only the parties to the collective bargaining
relationship.
Second, federal labor policy is
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the
agreement sought to be exempted concerns a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Finally,
the policy favoring collective bargaining is
furthered to the degree necessary to override the
antitrust laws only where the agreement sought to
be exempted is a product of bona fide arm’s-length
bargaining.165
In applying this test, the court found for Mackey.166 The court
found that the provision passed parts one and two of its test, but
that it failed part three.167 The court reasoned that the Rozelle Rule
had “not been the subject of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining for
either the 1968 or the 1970 [collective bargaining] agreement,
because the provision imposed significant restrictions on the
players to which they would never have agreed in good faith
bargaining.”168 This meant that “the Rozelle Rule did not fall
within the non-statutory labor exemption and was therefore,
subject to antitrust review.”169

164

Id. at 609.
Id. at 614.
166
Id. at 614 (citing Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1935)).
167
Id. at 616.
168
Jessica Cohen, Sharing the Wealth: Don’t Call Us, We’ll Call You: Why Revenue
Sharing is a Permissive Subject and Therefore the Labor Exemption Does Not Apply, 12
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 609, 626 (2002).
169
Id.
165
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Mackey was a significant win for free agency and signaled a
crucial gain for the NFLPA against the League’s management.
However, the Union was still far from strong and proceeded to
bargain away most of what it had gained from Mackey.170 As the
new collective bargaining agreement took shape in 1977, instead of
unlimited free agency, the two sides agreed to a system whereby a
right of first refusal was coupled with compensation for players
lost to another team.171 Much would have to change before the
League’s management considered the NFLPA a force to be
reckoned with.
G. Trying to Gain Yardage: The Growth of the NFLPA
In 1982, the 1977 collective bargaining agreement was set to
expire and the relationship between the NFL’s management and
the NFLPA was tense.172 A work stoppage was imminent.173
After several failed CBA negotiations, the players went on strike
on September 21, 1982.174
Several issues divided the owners and the players. Following
an NFLPA convention in Albuquerque, New Mexico, the players
adopted a proposal that “called for players to be paid 55% of the
clubs’ league-wide revenues.”175 The revenues were then to be
divided among the players “based on years of service, playtime
and individual and team performance.”176 Outraged by the terms
of this proposal, the owners refused to accept the players’ offer.177
The other sticking point was free agency.178 The owners
vehemently opposed free agency, as they viewed it as “destructive”
to league competition.179
170

Goplerud, supra note 151, at 23.
Id. at 24.
172
See id.
173
Id.
174
See id.
175
History:
The
1980’s—Era
of
Change,
NFL
PLAYERS
ASS’N,
http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) [hereinafter
History: The 1980’s].
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Goplerud, supra note 151, at 24.
179
Id. (noting that the league owners were particularly mindful of the “destructive
consequences” of free agency).
171
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The strike continued for almost two months.180 Owners
resisted any modification to the first refusal scheme.181
Eventually, however, the players and owners would settle as both
realized “the season would be canceled unless regular season
games resumed in early November.”182 As part of the settlement,
the owners agreed to a guaranteed player salary/benefit package
“worth at least $1.28 billion over the 1983–1987 seasons.”183
Ultimately, the owners got the better end of the bargain in the new
agreement.184 The agreement “did not include free agency, but
rather it merely fine tuned the right of first refusal system.”185
Moreover, this proved to be the beginning of the end of Ed
Garvey’s tenure as NFLPA executive director.186
In 1983, following Garvey’s departure from his post as
executive director, the NFLPA unanimously elected Gene
Upshaw187 to fill the position.188 Upshaw’s first objective was to
meet with the players and find out what they wanted from
management when the 1982 CBA expired in 1987.189 Most agreed
that free agency was of the utmost importance.190 Unmoved by the
Union’s persistence, the owners rejected the players’ demands for
free agency when collective bargaining for the 1987 CBA
began.191 The players ultimately responded by going on strike
again during the 1987 season.192 However, instead of continuing
negotiations during the strike, the owners sought out and hired
replacement players193 to fill their empty roster spots.194
180

Id.
Id.
182
History: The 1980’s, supra note 175.
183
Id.
184
Goplerud, supra note 151, at 25.
185
Id.
186
Levine & Maravent, supra note 109.
187
History: The 1980’s, supra note 175. Upshaw was NFLPA President during the
1982 CBA negotiations and Strike. Id.
188
Goplerud, supra note 151, at 25.
189
See History: The 1980’s, supra note 175.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. The replacement players were mostly comprised of players already cut during the
1987 preseason. Id.
194
Levine & Maravent, supra note 109.
181
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Additionally, some veteran players crossed the picket line due to
financial concerns and a lack of belief in the free agent system.195
It was clear to the Union that a strike would not work if the owners
were willing to replace the NFL players with second-class talent
and if some Union members continued to play in NFL games.
Thus, the Union ended the strike on October 15, 1987.196 Refusing
to give up its fight completely, however, the Union also filed an
antitrust suit against the NFL challenging the League’s right of
first refusal system.197 The lawsuit was Powell v. NFL.198
In Powell, the district court ruled in favor of the players in
January 1988.199 The court held that the 1987 collective
bargaining impasse ended the nonstatutory labor exemption that
the owners and Union otherwise enjoyed while the 1987 CBA was
in effect.200 As a result, the court found that the first refusal
system was subject to antitrust scrutiny and did in fact violate
antitrust law.201
The owners appealed the ruling, hoping for a reversal of the
decision.202 However, as a precaution, the owners also executed
“Plan B,” a system which released players at the bottom of the
roster from the first refusal system.203 Under the “Plan B” system,
each club could restrict the free agency movement of thirty-seven
players from their respective rosters and continue to subject them
to the first refusal system.204 “Players who were not restricted

195

History: The 1980’s, supra note 175.
Id.
197
Id.
198
Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988). The named plaintiff was NFLPA
President, Marvin Powell. Id.
199
Id. at 789.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
203
As a precaution, the owners implemented “Plan B,” which freed players at the
bottom of the roster from the first refusal/compensation system. Under the Plan B
system, which was implemented in 1989, clubs could restrict thirty-seven players and
continue to subject them to the first refusal system. Players who were not restricted could
sign with other clubs between February 1 and April 1 without restriction. See Ari Nissim,
The Trading Game: NFL Free Agency, the Salary Cap, and a Proposal for Greater
Trading Flexibility, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 257, 260 (2004).
204
Powell, 930 F.2d at 1304.
196
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could sign with other clubs between February 1 and April 1
without restriction.”205
On November 1, 1989, the owners got what they were looking
for on appeal: the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s
holding.206 The circuit court found that the nonstatutory labor
exemption protected the owners beyond impasse and that as a
result, the Union could not bring an antitrust suit against the
owners for implementation of a rule that was the product of good
faith bargaining.207 The Eighth Circuit’s holding sent the Union
back to the drawing board.
H. Calling an Audible: Decertifying the Union
While the Union had little to show for its latest legal battle with
the League’s management, it took notice of Judge Gerald Heaney’s
dissent, which suggested a brave move: break up the Union so that
the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer applies.208 Realizing
that Judge Heaney’s advice might be the only way to prevent the
League’s management from continuing to restrict free agency, the
Union formally disbanded on December 5, 1989.209 In place of the
Union, the players formed the NFLPA as a professional
association.210 The goal of the new organization was to pursue
litigation on behalf of individual players and challenge the “Plan
B” system.211
In 1990, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of New York Jets
Running Back Freeman McNeil. In this case, McNeil v. NFL,212
McNeil argued that “Plan B” rules restricting free agency violated
antitrust law and that the “Plan B” system was not immune from
antitrust scrutiny.213 After the district court found that the
205

History: The 1980’s, supra note 175.
Powell, 930 F.2d at 1293.
207
Id. at 1304.
208
Id. at 1304–07 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
209
History: The 1980’s, supra note 175.
210
History: 1990’s—The Growth of the Union, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N,
http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) [hereinafter
History: The 1990’s].
211
Id.
212
Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn. 1992).
213
See Goplerud, supra note 151, at 30.
206
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NFLPA’s change in status meant that the owners were no longer
exempt from antitrust law, a jury trial ensued.214 The players
finally got the result they were looking for. The jury found that the
“Plan B” system violated antitrust law in that it: “(1) had a
substantially harmful effect on competition, (2) significantly
contributed to competitive balance in the NFL, (3) [was] more
restrictive than necessary to achieve competitive balance in the
NFL, and (4) the players would be economically damaged as a
direct result of ‘Plan B.’”215
Having dealt a heavy blow to the League’s management in
McNeil v. NFL, the players sought a restraining order to stop the
NFL’s management from enforcing the “Plan B” system. In
Jackson v. National Football League,216 the court found that “Plan
B” prevented the players from becoming free agents and that as a
result, they were likely to suffer irreparable harm.217 Accordingly,
the court granted the injunction against the League management’s
enforcement of “Plan B,” signaling a turning point in the players’
relationship with the NFL’s management.218
I. Keeping the Drive Alive: From Reggie White to the Current
CBA
With the owners’ antitrust protection greatly diminished, the
players intensified their attack. The NFLPA’s leaders filed yet
another lawsuit in 1992, White v. NFL,219 seeking true free agency
and monetary relief.220 Realizing that the players had obtained
increased bargaining leverage from McNeil and Jackson, the
owners began settlement talks with the players involved in
White.221 Ultimately, a settlement was reached in 1993 after both
sides compromised.222 This settlement would shape the foundation
214

See id.
Nissim, supra note 203, at 261 (quoting McNeil, 1992 WL 315292, at *1).
216
802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992).
217
See Nissim, supra note 203, at 261 (citing Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F.
Supp. 226, 226 (D. Minn. 1992)).
218
Jackson, 802 F. Supp. at 228.
219
836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993), aff’d, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994).
220
Id.
221
Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1445.
222
Id.
215
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of the 1993 CBA as the players and owners came to a consensus
on a league-wide salary cap,223 free agency, revenue sharing, and
the rookie pool system.224 Having achieved labor peace, the
NFLPA became a certified union once again.225
Between 1993 and 2010, the NFLPA and the NFL’s
management have extended their 1993 CBA five times.226 During
this time period, the NFL was the only league of the four major
United States professional sports leagues not to experience a work
stoppage due to a labor dispute. Most recently, a CBA extension
took place in March 2006 when both sides voted to extend the
CBA through the 2011 season.227
However on May 20, 2008, League owners unanimously voted
to opt out of this agreement.228 At the time, the reasons given for
the early termination included high labor costs, cost problems with
the rookie system, and the owners’ inability to recoup the bonuses
of players who subsequently breached their contracts or refused to
perform.229 Under the terms of the 2006 CBA, the 2010 season
operated as the agreement’s final year because the NFL’s
management had opted out.230

223

The salary cap is an adjustable calculation that sets a team’s maximum payroll for a
league year. Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 98.
224
Nissim, supra note 203, at 261. Rookie contracts are limited under the CBA by a
salary cap within the overall league salary cap referred to as the “rookie pool.” Facts
About NFL Rookie Contracts, NFL PLAYERS, http://www.nflplayers.com/Articles/PublicNews/Facts-about-NFL-Rookie-Contracts (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
225
See History: The 1990’s, supra note 210.
226
Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1446.
227
Id.
228
See Daniel Kaplan, NFL Owners Feel No Choice but to Opt Out of Current CBA
Deal, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. DAILY (May 20, 2008), http://www.
sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/121003.
229
John Clayton, NFL Owners Vote Unanimously to Opt Out of Labor Deal, ESPN
(May 20, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3404596.
230
See NFL, NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management
Council and the NFL Players Association, Art. LVIII § 3(a) (Mar. 8, 2006).
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III. DELAY OF GAME: THE CURRENT LABOR DISPUTE BETWEEN THE
NFL’S MANAGEMENT AND THE NFL PLAYERS
During the current NFL labor dispute, the NFL’s management
and the NFLPA have continuously tried to negotiate toward a new
CBA. However, the parties face numerous obstacles that may
prevent them from reaching an agreement. The primary issue
between the two bargaining parties relates to the current revenue
split between players and owners.231 Secondary issues include
decreasing the cost of rookie salaries through a rookie wage
scale,232 changing the length of the regular season from sixteen to
eighteen games,233 the NFL Personal Conduct Policy (the
“Policy”),234 and the League’s policy regarding player discipline
for on-field actions.235
A. The Revenue Dispute
The biggest issue separating the NFL’s management and the
NFLPA is the revenue split between the players and the owners.236
Under the current CBA, the players receive almost 60% of total
league revenue237 leaving owners with the remaining roughly
40%.238 The owners want to amend the revenue split agreed to in
the 2006 CBA by increasing their allocation of revenue. The NFL
team owners argue that the current distribution is unsatisfactory
because they are “losing money per game due to the increased

231

See NFL, Union to Discuss New CBA Today as Sides Remain Far Apart, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.
com/article/135943
232
See Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1475.
233
See Roger Goodell: Owners Want 18 Games, ESPN (Aug. 26, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5497448 [hereinafter Owners Want 18
Games].
234
Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 100–01.
235
Barry Wilner, Football Big Hits: Players Want More Say in Discipline for Illegal
Hits,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
11,
2010,
5:05
PM),
http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/11/football-big-hits-players_n_782315.html?ref=tw
[hereinafter Wilner, Football Big Hits].
236
See Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 98–100.
237
See id. at 98.
238
Id.
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Conversely, “the NFLPA claims that the owners are not only
earning a profit each year, but that the values of the NFL
franchises are increasing at a rapid rate.”241 In support of this
point, it has been pointed out that “the NFL’s revenue has
increased 43 percent since 2006 to $9.3 billion.”242 Complicating
matters is the fact that the League will not release any related
financial information, arguing that the NFLPA knows the League’s
financial situation and is aware that the NFL’s largest costs are
player salaries.243
In response to the League’s unwillingness to reveal its financial
data, many players have begun giving the NFLPA their backing to
decertify the Union in the event of a labor lockout.244 By
disbanding the Union, the labor exemption to antitrust law would
no longer apply to the NFL owners and the NFL players could sue
the League under antitrust law, arguing that the labor lockout
constituted a group boycott by the owners.245
Public scrutiny and pressure have also intensified the
negotiation process. On August 6, 2010, two senators weighed in
on the labor dispute, urging the NFL’s management and the
NFLPA to come to some sort of resolution before a work stoppage
239

In recent years, “the cost of building stadiums for professional sports franchises has
increased beyond the ability for owners or even public entities to pay for them alone.”
See Cost of Building Sports Stadiums Skyrockets, SAN DIEGO 6,
http://www.sandiego6.com/news/local/story/Cost-of-Building-Sports-StadiumsSkyrockets/InsCySsu10CXMnNkV5JT6g.cspx.
240
Redding & Peterson, supra note 18.
241
Id.
242
Sally Jones, NFL Owners Want Guarantees that no Other Business Provides, WASH.
POST (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/
16/AR2011021603846.html.
243
See Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1475 (“The NFL is not going to provide
any financial information to the Union because it is not claiming an inability to pay.”).
244
See, e.g., Steelers Players Vote to Decertify the Union if Needed, YAHOO!SPORTS
(Oct. 6, 2010, 4:48 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=txsteelersnflpa
(explaining that the Steelers are at least the tenth group of players to vote to decertify if
necessary, joining players from the Packers, Bengals, Bills, Colts, Cowboys, Saints,
Eagles, Redskins and Giants).
245
Liz Mullen, NFLPA Seeks Authority to Decertify, http://aol.sportingnews.com/
nfl/feed/2010-09/nfl-labor-talks/story/nflpa-seeks-authority-to-decertify.
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occurs.246 Senator George LeMieux (R-FL) argued that the
country cannot afford the more than 125,000 layoffs that would
come with an NFL lockout.247 A spokesman for the Union
responded that the “[p]layers recognize that the business of the
NFL impacts the businesses of America in a profound way. A
lockout puts jobs at risk. We continue to work diligently to
prevent a lockout.”248 While several NFL owners and executives
finally expressed hope this past October that the CBA could be
renewed before expiring, the actions of the NFL and the NFLPA
tell a different story.249 For example, the NFL’s management is
building a nearly $900 million lockout fund financed from its
savings.250 Similarly, the NFLPA is building its own reserves to
cope with the effects of any future work stoppage.251
B. Rookie Salaries
While player contracts in other United States professional
sports leagues are guaranteed,252 the NFL’s player contracts
traditionally have not been.253 This trend, however, has recently
changed, especially for top NFL rookies.254 “While the top five
draft picks in 2002 secured an average of twenty-seven percent of
their compensation guaranteed, the top five picks in 2010 got fifty-

246

See Eamon Javers, Two Senators Urge NFL to Resolve Labor Disputes, CNBC (Oct.
13, 2010, 3:13 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39655215.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
See Daniel Kaplan, NFL Pools $900M for Labor Fight, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS
BUS. J., Nov. 1, 2010, at 01, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/
2010/11/01/nfl-pools-900m-for-labor-fight.html?s=print (reporting that both the NFL and
the Union are saving funds in case they fail to agree to a new CBA).
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
When a contract is “guaranteed,” it means that regardless of whether the player
performs well or gets injured during the course of the contract and cannot perform, he
still receives the full value of his contract. Rachel Bachman, Trend in Guaranteed Money
in NFL Contracts Pays Big for Ndamukong Suh, Other Potential Stars, OR. LIVE (Aug. 6,
2010, 10:30 AM) http://blog.oregonlive.com/nfl/2010/08/trend_in_guaranteed_money_
in_n.html.
253
Id.
254
Id. (explaining that when news of 2010 NFL draft pick Ndamukong Suh’s contract
broke, the most important part of it was not the total compensation of the contract ($68
million) but that $40 million of the contract was guaranteed).
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nine percent.”255 Reining in inflated rookie salaries is one of the
issues on which both the League and the NFLPA can come to an
agreement.256
The owners would like to see rookie salaries capped or reduced
in some way due to the unprecedented cost that owners are
incurring to obtain top college talent.257 Veteran players, making
up a large portion of the NFLPA, would also like to see rookie
salaries managed in a more cost-effective way out of respect for
seasoned NFL players.258 Nevertheless, the League and the Union
remain apart on what should be done to remedy this problem.
“The League is proposing that a rookie wage scale and a
mechanism that credits against NFL club owners’ expenses be
implemented into the new CBA. Under this proposal, these
expenses will be deducted from revenues that determine the NFL
salary cap, thereby providing cost savings.” 259 Alternatively, “the
NFLPA has put forth the idea of a ‘Proven Performance Plan,’
which would shorten the duration of standard rookie contracts
from four years to three,” but would make rookies unrestricted free
agents after their contracts expire.260 The League argues that the
unrestricted free agent provision would render the NFLPA’s
proposal ineffective because although rookie salary costs would be
reduced due to shorter contracts, unrestricted free agency would
destroy the League’s “competitive balance.”261
255

Id.
See Mawae: Big Rookie Contracts Like Ryan’s ‘Disheartening,’ ESPN (May 21,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3406508&source=
2008,
4:43
PM),
NFLHeadlines (quoting NFLPA President Kevin Mawae as saying that Matt Ryan’s sixyear, $72 million rookie contract with the Atlanta Falcons was “a little disheartening”
because a “young guy” who had never stepped on a NFL football field was getting “paid
that kind of money”).
257
Id.
258
Id. NFLPA president Kevin Mawae explaining that “[a]s a guy who has been in the
league for 14 now going on 15 years and being around other veteran guys, for a young
guy to get paid that kind of money and never steps foot on an NFL football field, it’s a
little disheartening to think of.” Id.
259
Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1479–80.
260
Doug Farrar, The Real Story Behind the Rookie Wage Scale, YAHOO!SPORTS,
http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/blog/shutdown_corner/post/The-real-story-behind-the-rookiewage-scale?urn=nfl-260642 (last visited Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Farrar, Rookie Wage
Scale].
261
Id.
256
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Augmenting the divide is the fact that many NFL fans across
the country have become incensed that as most Americans
continue to suffer through the worst recession in decades, NFL
rookie contracts and player contracts in general have continued to
inflate. While the press has criticized both the NFL’s management
and NFLPA for this phenomenon, both parties have publicly
placed the blame on each other.262
This has only made
negotiations more difficult.
C. The Eighteen Game Season
The NFL’s management would like to increase the number of
regular season NFL games from sixteen to eighteen.263 This is
because the addition of two regular season games would allow the
NFL team owners to generate more revenue over the course of a
season from ticket sales, merchandise, etc.264 To implement this
plan, owners propose keeping the season at its current twenty-week
length, but “reducing the number of preseason games from four to
two”265and adding two of those games to the regular season
schedule.
Across the League, however, “many players question the
wisdom of making an already grueling season even longer,” while
also limiting regular season preparation time.266 Players propose
that an eighteen-game regular season should include “changes in
the rules governing injured players” and “an extra bye week”267 to
deal with the added hardship of a longer regular season.268 The
players feel that while the season would still be twenty weeks long,
additional regular season games pose a greater risk of injury

262

Id.
Owners Want 18 Games, supra note 233.
264
See id. (quoting Bob Kraft, owner of the New England Patriots, as saying, “I think
it’s a win-win all around”).
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
A “bye week” is a week during which a team does not have to play a game. Tom
Stryker, Inside Look at NFL Bye Weeks, SPREAD, http://www.thespread.com/
forum/topic/Inside-Look-at-NFL-Bye-Weeks/74233/?p=214345 (last visited Jan. 31,
2011). Currently, each team is given one bye week over the course of an NFL regular
season. Id.
Id.
263
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because regular season games are more competitive than preseason
games.269
In response to the players’ proposal, Miami Dolphins owner,
Stephen Ross, publicly defended the League’s eighteen-game plan:
[T]he studies [on additional regular season games]
show [that it] will not really increase injuries.
We’re still playing 20 games. We’re eliminating
two preseason games and adding two regular season
games, which is really what helps with the
revenues, and make[s] the fans a lot happier and
those games will be a lot more meaningful. But in
terms of the players, they’re still playing 20
games.270
The NFLPA quickly fired back on Twitter saying, “this is the
kind of statement that drives players crazy. Every game is a risk of
injury . . .”271
Critically, New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft
explained, “I really think going to an 18-game season is critical to
us getting a labor deal. There’s not a lot [of] ways in this
economic environment we can generate incremental revenues.
That’s the best way.”272
D. The NFL Personal Conduct Policy
The NFL Personal Conduct Policy states that “[a]ll persons
associated with the NFL are required to avoid “conduct detrimental
to the integrity of and public confidence in the National Football
League.”273 This requirement applies to players, coaches, other
269

Longer Season Carries Injury Risks, SPORTS & STARS (Nov. 24, 2010, 1:40 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/ articles/85304/20101124/longer-season-carries-injury-risks-nflplayers.htm.
270
Sarah Talalay, Dolphins Owner Irks Players Union with Comments on 18-Game
Season, BUS. OF SPORTS—SUN SENTINEL BLOGS (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://blogs.trb.com/sports/custom/business/blog/2010/11/dolphins_owner_irks_players_
un.html.
271
Id.
272
Owners Want 18 Games, supra note 233.
273
Casinova O. Henderson, How Much Discretion is Too Much for the NFL
Commissioner to Have Over the Players Off-the-Field Conduct? 17 SPORTS LAW. J. 167,
170 (2010).
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team employees, owners, game officials, and all others working for
the NFL.274 The Policy gives the NFL’s Commissioner the
ultimate authority to discipline any violator of the Policy and the
power to review any appeal.275 The Commissioner’s authority to
discipline players flows directly from the CBA, the NFL Player
Contract, and the NFL Constitution and Bylaws.276
In 2007, the Policy underwent a massive overhaul when
Commissioner Goodell extended it to include players’ off-the-field
conduct.277 In defending this change, Commissioner Goodell
stated, “We hold ourselves to higher standards of responsible
conduct because of what it means to be part of the National
Football League . . . this policy is a further step in ensuring that
everyone who is part of the NFL meets that standard.”278
However, Commissioner Goodell’s implementation of the new
conduct policy was arguably a “unilateral change in employment
terms and conditions” of the CBA because the Union did not have
the opportunity to negotiate or engage in collective bargaining with
the League over the Policy’s changes.279 Thus, the Policy has
become a sticking point for the players. The Union and its leaders
believe that Commissioner Goodell’s implementation of the Policy
reaches too far and “provide[s] no guidelines in the application of
fines and/or suspensions due to off-field behavior.”280 The NFLPA
would also like to have an independent arbitrator hear appeals of
League discipline.281
Complicating negotiations, Commissioner Goodell’s decision
to extend the Policy to off-the-field conduct has been largely
vindicated by several players’ high profile off-the-field
274

Id.
Id. at 170–71.
276
Id. at 175.
277
See Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 100.
278
Goodell Issues Memo Enforcing Player Safety Rules, NFL.COM (Oct. 20, 2010, 5:51
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81b7b9ef/article/goodell-issues-memoenforcing-player-safety-rules.
279
Henderson, supra note 273, at 185–86.
280
See Andrew Brandt, Roethlisberger, Favre and the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy,
FORBES (Oct. 13, 2010, 1:09 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/sportsmoney/2010/10/13/
roethlisberger-farve-and-the-nfls-personal-conduct-policy.
281
Id.
275
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transgressions.282 Since the Policy’s extension, Commissioner
Goodell has suspended players such as Marshawn Lynch for three
games for carrying a concealed firearm,283 punished Michael Vick
for his role in a dog fighting operation for up to six regular season
games,284 suspended Donte Stallworth indefinitely for killing a
man while driving intoxicated,285 and suspended Ben
Roethlisberger for four games after a twenty-year-old female
college student accused him of sexually assaulting her in a Georgia
nightclub.286
One of the more interesting facets of this issue is that team
owners are caught somewhere in between Commissioner Goodell’s
policy extension and the players’ respective positions. Owners do
not want to see their players get suspended, but they also do not
want team patrons to think that they condone crude and sometimes
criminal behavior. For this reason, some team owners have
advocated for the greater use of a team-enforced, rather than
league-enforced, personal conduct policy.287
E. Player Discipline for Illegal Hits
An emerging issue between the League and the players has
been the League’s cracking down on what constitutes an illegal hit
during the course of a football game. Following a series of
devastating plays in games played on October 17, 2010, that left
multiple players seriously hurt with head, neck, and other related

282

Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 100–01.
Id. at 100.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Roethlisberger
Suspended
by
NFL,
ESPN
(Apr.
22,
2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ nfl/news/story?id=5121614.
287
See NFL to Announce Tougher Player Conduct Policy Next Week, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
article/110530 (“It looks strange to the public when a player misbehaves and nothing
happens.”).
283
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injuries,288 the League ramped up its regulation of helmet-tohelmet hits.289
Commissioner Goodell explained:
One of our most important priorities is protecting
our players from needless injury. In recent years,
we have emphasized minimizing contact to the head
and neck, especially where a defenseless player is
involved. It is clear to me that further action is
required to emphasize the importance of teaching
safe and controlled techniques, and of playing
within the rules. It is incumbent on all of us to
support the rules we have in place to protect
players.290
Following Commissioner Goodell’s statement, the League
imposed a $75,000 fine and three $50,000 fines on four players
who committed fouls under the revamped discipline system.291
Many NFL players believe they should have a greater voice in
handing out fines and suspensions for illegal hits.292 Currently, all
plays are reviewed by the League’s officiating and operations
offices.293 The players are interested in making sure that some of
those reviewers are their peers.294 Commissioner Goodell said the
League is opposed to player reviewers, emphasizing that he is not
part of the fines process; appeals are heard and decided by Hall of
Fame player Art Shell and former NFL coach Ted Cottrell.295 The

288
Helmet-to-Helmet Hits Draw Ire of NFL’s Fromer VP of Officiating, AOL NEWS
(Oct. 18, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/10/18/helmet-to-helmet-hitsdraw-ire-of-former-vp-of-officiating.
289
Id. A helmet-to-helmet hit occurs when the defensive player leads with his helmet to
strike the offensive player’s helmet in the course of making a tackle on the offensive
player. Id.
290
Danny Cox, NFL Notifies Teams of New Illegal Hit Discipline with Letter and
Video, EXAMINER (Oct. 21, 2010, 6:47 PM), http://www.examiner.com/nfl-innational/nfl-notifies-teams-of-new-illegal-hit-discipline-with-letter-and-video.
291
Wilner, Football Big Hits, supra note 235.
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id.
295
Id.
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NFL’s management and the NFLPA jointly pay their salaries.296
Nevertheless, players have expressed concern about the subjective
nature of the appeals system.297
Buffalo Bills safety George Wilson views all of these issues as
intertwined with negotiations for a new CBA.298
Wilson
explained: “It’s imperative for the [U]nion to feel like they have a
voice in the disciplinary process, at least have a voice at the table.
I know that can come in a lot of capacities and aspects, but guys
just want to feel like their voices are heard.”299
IV. TOUCHDOWN: USING MEDIATION TO REACH A NEW CBA
Positive working relationships are vital in all businesses,
including professional sports.300 Thus, “bitter negotiations in
sports labor disputes can lead to unique problems.”301 This is
especially true when the labor dispute involves collective
bargaining.
While both the NFL’s management and the NFLPA have a
mutual interest in each other’s success and should work together to
reach a new CBA, parties involved in these types of labor disputes
often become entrenched in their positions and publicly fight
caustic and financially draining labor battles.302 Indeed, NFL team
owners have already declared that the players should not receive as
much revenue as they are currently receiving.303 In retaliation, the
players have publicly questioned the integrity of the owners’
claims that they are financially strapped, threatened to decertify the
Union, and threatened to sue the League in the event of a

296

Id.
Id.
298
Id.
299
Id.
300
Peter Kupelian, The Use of Mediation for Resolving Salary Disputes in Sports,
KUPELIAN ORMOND & MAGY, http://kompc.com/289/articles/the-use-of-mediation-forresolving-salary-disputes-in-sports (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
301
Id.
302
Id.
303
See Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 98–100.
297
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lockout.304 The effect of these actions is that two parties that
otherwise need each other to thrive have publicly humiliated one
another, alienated their fan base, and made it harder to work
together toward reaching a new CBA.
Mediation is an ideal remedy for resolving labor disputes in
professional sports and helping the NFL’s management and the
NFL players reach a new CBA. It provides the best forum for
open communication, which can be used to preserve and advance
the parties’ working relationship, it offers an expedited and
financially rewarding way to come to a resolution, and it offers
both parties a sense of privacy.305
A. Mediation Can Preserve and Foster Working Relationships
Mediation takes into consideration the human toll of conflict
and fosters healthier communication between disputants.306 It also
allows for the parties’ collaboration in the decision making process
and mutual satisfaction in the outcome.307 This is critical for
resolving the NFL labor dispute because as Buffalo Bills safety
George Wilson explained, “Guys just want to feel like their voices
are heard.”308
The ability to foster positive outcomes and mutual decision
making can be realized through the use of a mediator.309 This
person, chosen by both parties, is trained to bring about
collaborative resolution by providing an environment of
neutrality.310 Therefore, given the NFL management’s view that
AFL-CIO President, Richard Trumka, could not provide for a

304

See Union Head Says Owners Set for Lockout, ESPN (Oct. 5, 2010, 6:51 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5652700.
305
Kupelian, supra note 300 (“[M]ediation remains a relatively cheap first step at
attempting to resolve a dispute that may potentially reach tens of millions of dollars. A
mediator’s pay can be analogized to the fee for visiting of psychiatrist, or perhaps
preventive investments in a tangible good.”).
306
Kathleen C. Wallace, A Proposal for the United States Olympic Committee to
Incorporate Formal Mediation Within its Grievance Process, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
59, 65 (2005).
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Id. at 69.
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Wilner, Football Big Hits, supra note 235.
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Wallace, supra note 306.
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Kupelian, supra note 300.
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neutral environment as mediator, Trumka’s offer to mediate the
NFL CBA negotiations was flawed in a critical respect.
However, while Trumka might not be the ideal candidate to
mediate this dispute, he has the right idea. The infusion of a
neutral mediator into a hostile labor dispute can make a great
difference in the dispute’s outcome. This is especially true when
the parties have a long and tumultuous negotiation history, as the
NFL’s management and the NFLPA do. The mediator can help
identify and address each party’s key issues and goals, while
keeping each party focused on building a brighter future, rather
than focusing on a bitter past.311
The mediator can also encourage positive working
relationships by engaging each party in private discussions during
the mediation.312 During the course of a negotiation, disputants do
not always feel comfortable sharing their private issues and/or
negotiation goals with one another. Typically when this occurs,
negotiations will either stall or reach an impasse.313 However, in
the mediation setting, the mediator can call a private caucus to
prevent this from happening.314 A private caucus occurs when the
mediator talks with each party and its lawyers in confidence.315
During the private caucus, the mediator will listen to each side’s
concerns and agree not to divulge any of this information until
clearance is received from each party.316 In the meantime, this
information can help the mediator shape negotiations and
encourage good-faith bargaining aimed at creating a resolution that
meets both parties’ needs.317
Here, caucusing could assist with the production of critical
NFL financial information relating to the League’s profitability.318

311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7.
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This, in turn, would be an enormous step toward helping the
parties reconcile their differences and reaching a new CBA.319
B. Mediation Can Expedite a Resolution and Save Money
Not surprisingly, when high-profile disputes arise and
communications begin to break down, it can be difficult to get
negotiations back on track.320 Rather than working together,
parties will often resort to insulting each other in the media,
stockpiling assets to fund a protracted conflict, and adopting a
wait-and-see approach to negotiations.321 The conflict drags on
and reaches a juncture where multiple egos become involved in the
dispute, making a joint resolution unlikely.322 The time and money
spent on defending each party’s position also becomes significant
and irretrievable.323
The NFL labor dispute has already begun to resemble this
unproductive model of conflict resolution.324 As this conflict
continues, the likelihood of both parties suffering through long,
costly, and publicly bitter litigation greatly increases.325 It also
increases the likelihood of both parties experiencing enormous
financial losses due to game cancellations.326
What both parties need to realize is that not only will mediation
be far more sensible in resolving their dispute, it will also be faster
and cheaper.327 These are crucial benefits as the current CBA ends
in March 2011 and the tentative start of the 2011–2012 season is
less than a year away.
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Id.
Kupelian, supra note 300.
321
See, e.g., Darrelle Revis Contract Talks with Jets to be Kept out of Public Eye,
NESN.COM (Aug. 12, 2010, 2:49 PM), http://www.nesn.com/2010/08/darrelle-reviscontract-talks-with-jets-to-be-kept-out-of-public-eye.html; see also Kaplan, NFL Pools
$900 for Labor Fight, supra note 249.
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See Wallace, supra note 306, at 64.
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See id.
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See Kaplan, NFL Pools $900M for Labor Fight, supra note 249.
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See, e.g., Liz Mullen, NFLPA Seeks Authority to Decertify, DALLAS BUS. J. (Sept.
13, 2010, 9:11 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2010/09/13/daily1.html
(stating that the NFLPA intends to decertify so that it may file an antitrust challenge).
326
Wilner, Lockout, supra note 21.
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Wallace, supra note 306, at 64.
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Mediation offers the parties a set mechanism for early
engagement with one another and an opportunity to take control of
their problems before they become unsolvable. The parties can
elect to have the right and ability to control the identity of the
mediator, the timing and scheduling of the sessions, the nature of
discussions, and the confidentiality of the negotiations.328 In
addition, the cost of having to pay a mediator is negligible in
comparison to the cost the parties would incur if the 2011 season
were cancelled and/or this dispute were to be litigated.329
For the NFL’s management, the reduced expenditure on labor
negotiations increases funds available to support other League
initiatives and promote the game of football. For the players, the
increased time and money allows for better offseason training and
a greater focus on the upcoming season.
C. Mediation Can Help Prevent a Public Relations Disaster
Public relations are important in any industry. However,
professional sports leagues are especially dependent on public
reaction.330 A professional sports league’s inability to gauge
public reaction can lead to negative effects on business and must
be reversed as early as possible to stop irreparable harm and loss of
public confidence.331 While many professional sports leagues have
traditionally been sluggish in reacting to public outcry and
negative publicity, the NFL has been quite adept in the past at
responding to its fans’ demands and promulgating socially
responsible initiatives and policies.332 These include NFL Play
60,333 the NFL and United Way Hometown Huddle,334 and

328

Kupelian, supra note 300.
Id.
330
See Greenberg, Sports Facility Leases, supra note 28, at 101–02.
331
Kupelian, supra note 300 (explaining that both MLB and the NBA have suffered for
failing to take fan interest and public concern into account).
332
See, e.g., Goodell Issues Memo Enforcing Player Safety Rules, supra note 278
(“[A]s an employee of the NFL or a member club, you are held to a higher standard and
expected to conduct yourself in a way that is responsible, promotes the values upon
which the league is based, and is lawful.”).
333
NFLRUSH, http://www.nflrush.com/play60 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). NFL PLAY
60 is a national youth health and fitness campaign focused on increasing the wellness of
young fans by encouraging them to be active for at least sixty minutes a day. Id.
329
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Although labor disputes are only a part of the public relations
puzzle, long and drawn out public CBA negotiations between the
NFL owners and the players will negatively impact the NFL’s
overall public perception, and ultimately, its business.336 This is
especially the case when during a national recession, the majority
of the parties’ negotiations center on which party should receive
the greater share of billions of dollars in revenue.337 Further
adding to the public relations concern is that if the parties do not
come to a resolution and a work stoppage does occur, many
American cities will lose millions of dollars and thousands of
jobs.338
Mediation will offer the public hope that this dispute could be
resolved at an earlier stage, while also limiting the parties’ public
display of greed and pettiness during negotiations.339 Even though
mediation may not resolve the dispute immediately, ground rules
could be established requiring confidentiality during the course of,
and in between mediation sessions. This would minimize adverse
media commentary on the NFL labor dispute’s status and thereby
limit negative public reaction. It would also prevent either party
from misrepresenting the other’s proposals in the press and from
using the court of public opinion to try hotly contested labor issues,
which only fuels interparty animosity and makes negotiating a new
CBA nearly impossible.340

334
NFL and United Way, UNITED WAY CAPITAL AREA, http://unitedwaycapitalarea.org/
partners/nfl_and_united_way.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). Hometown Huddle is a
national day of community service, during which NFL players and representatives from
each of the thirty-two NFL teams lend aid and assistance to members of their
communities. Id.
335
See Goodell Issues Memo Enforcing Player Safety Rules, supra note 278 (explaining
that as a result of negative league publicity stemming from player incidents, NFL teams
will be disciplined when their employees, including players, violate the league’s personal
conduct policy).
336
Kupelian, supra note 300.
337
AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7.
338
Id.
339
Kupelian, supra note 300.
340
Farrar, Rookie Wage Scale, supra note 260.
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Ultimately, nothing can limit the public relations headache that
the NFL will experience if there is a work stoppage next season.
However, mediation can help put a cap on the negative publicity
that the NFL’s management and the NFLPA receive as labor
negotiations continue and can increase the likelihood that the
public relations nightmare of an NFL work stoppage never
materializes.
V. INSIDE THE HUDDLE: CONDUCTING THE MEDIATION
Having realized the benefits that mediation affords the parties,
the NFL’s management and the NFLPA agreed to enter into
mediation on February 17, 2011.341 Choosing mediation is an
important step toward saving the 2011–2012 NFL season and
avoiding the significant job and money losses that could occur in
the event of a work stoppage.342 However, now that the NFL’s
management and the NFLPA have opted for mediation, the
mediation sessions must be structured and conducted in a way that
will encourage consensus between the parties. Otherwise, any
mediation session that the parties hold will prove futile in resolving
this labor dispute.
A. Picking a Referee: The Mediator
As the NFL’s management correctly states in its response to
Richard Trumka’s September 30, 2010, letter, any mediator that is
going to mediate the NFL’s CBA negotiations must be a mutually
agreed upon neutral third party.343 For several reasons, this is a
fundamental precept of mediation344 that both the NFL’s
management and the NFLPA have followed in appointing the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (“FMCS”), an
independent United States government agency, to oversee the

341

NFL, Players Union Agree to Mediation in Labor Negotiations, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 17, 2011, 3:55PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/football/nfl/
02/17/nfl-union-mediation.ap/index.html.
342
See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7.
343
Id.
344
See What is Mediation?, supra note 30.
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FMCS director George H. Cohen346 will be the

First, having a mutually agreed upon mediator makes both the
NFL’s management and the NFLPA responsible for the role that
the mediator plays in conducting the mediation and gives each
party an equal stake in how the mediation process is managed.348
This assures both parties’ interest and commitment to having a
productive mediation.349
Furthermore, agreement over the
mediator can often be symbolic of a change in tone between
disputing parties and signal the first of several compromises to
come.350 This would be particularly true in the case of this labor
dispute as both the NFL’s management and the NFLPA have
refused to concede any ground on all key labor issues and continue
to have vitriolic exchanges.351 Lastly, having a neutral third party
mediator is the primary way to ensure that both the NFL’s
management and the NFLPA trust each other and the mediation
process.352 This is crucial because successful mediation hinges on
the parties being comfortable with exchanging their respective
bargaining positions and willingness to work together to achieve
mutual gains.353 The parties will not do this if they do not trust
each other or if the mediator is being coercive and fails to protect
the parties’ interests adequately and equally.354
Given the unique nature of the professional sports industry and
this labor dispute, it is also important that the mediator have

345

See NFL, Players Union Agree to Mediation, supra note 341.
George H. Cohen has extensive sports labor relations experience having been
involved in the NBA’s, the NHL’s, MLB’s and Major League Soccer’s past CBA
negotiations. See id.
347
Id.
348
ROBERT FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 27 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).
349
Id.
350
Jeff Carlisle, A Glimmer of Hope in the CBA Talks, ESPN, http://soccernet.
espn.go.com/columns/story?id=751412&sec=mls&root=mls&cc=5901 (last visited Feb.
9, 2011).
351
Jim Corbett, Analyst Sees Way to Avert Stoppage, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2011, at 7C.
352
Kupelian, supra note 300.
353
See JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A
NUTSHELL 74–75 (3d ed. 2008).
354
See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7.
346
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significant experience mediating comparable types of labor
negotiations.355 Having a mediator with professional sports league
labor relations expertise, such as George H. Cohen, provides many
advantages that would not otherwise be afforded to the NFL’s
management and the NFLPA.
First, a mediator with this type of experience is likely to
already comprehend the extensive labor relations history and
current struggle between the parties.356 This will allow the
mediation process to move swiftly and efficiently which is vital
because the parties do not have long before the current CBA
expires.357 Second, as often is the case with professional sports
league CBA negotiations, here, the parties to the dispute are large
organizations, with sizable labor relations teams made up of
attorneys, businesspeople, and former players.358 A mediator with
Cohen’s experience understands how to manage the different
personalities and egos that will inevitably accompany any
mediation session(s) and that would otherwise threaten the
productivity of the mediation process.359 Third, the consequences
of failing to reach a new CBA could be devastating.360 This will
likely create a pressure-packed atmosphere during mediation and
as negotiations move forward.361 A mediator such as Cohen, who
has been in this position before, is in the best position to handle
this hostile atmosphere and can exert a calming influence over the

355

Kupelian, supra note 300.
History, NFLPA, http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Feb. 5,
2011).
357
Kupelian, supra note 300.
358
Greg Rosenthal, NFLPA: “Any Suggestion We Want a Lockout Is Coming From
Outer Space,” NBCSPORTS (Jan. 13, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.
com/2011/01/13/nflpa-any-suggestion-we-want-a-lockout-is-coming-from-outer-space.
359
See Edwin P. Ahrens, Why Should I Care?, MEDIATE, http://www.mediate.com/
articles/ahrens30.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
360
See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7 (explaining that a lockout could cost thousands of
Americans their jobs and cities more than $140 million in revenue).
361
Doug Farrar, Ochocinco Grills Goodell During Commissioner’s Press Conference,
YAHOO!SPORTS (Feb. 5, 2001, 9:09 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/blog/shutdown_
corner/post/Video-Ochocinco-grills-Goodell-during-Commissio?urn=nfl-317260
(explaining that player anxiety is only going to grow as the deadline date for the
expiration of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement gets closer)[hereinafter Farrar,
Ochocinco].
356
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already anxious parties by laying out a framework for how
mediation should proceed.362
B. Officiating the Game: The Mediator’s Role
Ultimately, Cohen cannot force the NFL’s management and the
NFLPA to agree on a new CBA.363 However, the role that he
plays will have a profound impact on the outcome of this dispute.
It will be up to Cohen to “[interpret] concerns, [relay] information
between the parties, [frame] the issues, and [refocus] the
problems.”364
As previously stated, the anxiety level at any mediation session
that occurs between the NFL’s management and the NFLPA has to
be high.365 With so much riding on the negotiations, the pressure
is going to mount with each successive session.366 For this reason,
Cohen must remain a composed third party that can control the
negotiations when necessary.367 In particular, Cohen should do
three things during the course of the mediation process to help
ensure that mediation is as successful as possible.
First, Cohen should obtain an understanding of what each
party’s view of the situation is from the outset of mediation.368 By
understanding each party’s position and goals, Cohen can
determine how each mediation session should proceed.369 To do
this, it would be wise for Cohen to conduct separate meetings with
both the NFL’s management and the NFLPA before any joint
mediation sessions begin.370 This would prevent the parties’
hostilities from getting in the way of Cohen’s comprehension of
the key issues.371

362

See NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 353, at 82.
Id. at 70 (explaining that in mediation, the mediator cannot impose a decision on the
parties).
364
Id. at 85.
365
See Farrar, Ochocinco, supra note 361.
366
Id.
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See NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 353, at 82.
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Id. at 75.
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Next, Cohen should confer with the parties at the outset of
mediation to determine what the mediation schedule is going to
be.372 Setting out a schedule at the beginning of mediation helps
the NFL’s management and the NFLPA establish a concrete
meeting plan and steady dialogue. This would be of particular help
in the case of this dispute as the parties have been unable to
maintain consistent dialogue regarding CBA negotiations since
labor talks first began in June 2009. Once mediation starts, the
sessions will become contentious at times.373 Either party could
desire to walk away from mediation.374 However, having a
previously agreed upon schedule is an effective prophylactic to this
type of problem because it is a constant reminder from the outset
that both parties are dedicated to seeing the mediation process
through to the end and reaching an agreement.
Finally, Cohen will have to know when to call a “timeout.” If
it appears that a resolution may be difficult to achieve during a
joint session, Cohen should request to meet separately with the
NFL’s management and the NFLPA in private caucuses.375 This
will allow each party to confidentially share sensitive information
and any concerns it has with how negotiations are proceeding.
Moreover, if the NFL’s management is unwilling in a joint session
to produce the League financial data that the NFLPA has
requested, Cohen should urge the NFL’s management to produce
this information during its private caucus. Cohen would then have
the opportunity to review the data and interpret its meaning. After
considering the financial information, Cohen could make an
objective recommendation during the next joint session as to how
League revenue should be divided in the new CBA. So long as the
NFLPA is informed of the fact that Cohen’s recommendation is
based on the NFL management’s full financial disclosure during
the private caucus, the NFLPA would have little reason to object to
Cohen’s proposal and the NFL’s management would not have to
372

Id.
Chris Mortensen & Adam Schefter, Sources: Sides Could Talk this Week,
ESPN.COM (Feb. 11, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=6119630
[hereinafter Mortensen & Schefter, Sides Could Talk].
374
Chris Mortensen, NFL-Union Talks Canceled, ESPN (Feb. 11, 2011),
http://m.espn.go.com/nfl/story?storyId=6107737.
375
See NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 353, at 83.
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reveal the contents of its financial data to the NFLPA. This
compromise, in turn, would be a monumental step toward
resolving this labor dispute as it would significantly alleviate
tensions over the revenue split, the primary issue separating the
parties.
C. The NFL’s Management and The NFLPA: What Must Happen
While Cohen can significantly influence the outcome of
mediation, it will be up to the NFL’s management and the NFLPA
whether to agree on a new CBA.376 Given that the NFL’s
management and the NFLPA have already had negotiations
regarding a new CBA, both parties have an understanding of what
the other is seeking.377 Thus, the parties should view mediation as
an opportunity to compromise on outstanding labor issues so that a
new CBA is reached. However, for the mediation process to be
successful, several things must happen between the parties during
the course of mediation.
First, the mediation process will only work if the parties are
willing to bargain in good faith.378 The parties have to be honest
with one another and must actually desire a resolution of this
dispute for mediation to be effective. With such a great deal of
animosity built up between the parties, this could prove difficult.379
However, it will be up to the parties to put their emotions aside and
realize that working together to reach an agreement is the only way
to stave off disaster.
Next, assuming that the parties are willing to bargain in good
faith, the NFL’s management must be more forthcoming with
financial information. So far, the NFL’s management has refused
to disclose financial statements to the NFLPA in support of their
position that teams are losing money.380 However, production of
this information is essential for a successful negotiation between
the parties because it is the only way to demonstrate to the NFLPA

376
377
378
379
380

Id. at 75.
Mortensen, NFL-Union Talks Canceled, supra note 374.
See NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 353, at 100.
See Mortensen & Schefter, Sides Could Talk, supra note 373.
See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7.
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that the owners’ position regarding the revenue split is justified.381
Failure to produce this information only lessens the NFL
management’s credibility and makes it less likely that a
compromise over the distribution of league revenue will be
reached. As this is the pivotal point of contention between the
NFL’s management and the NFLPA, resolution of this issue is
essential to reaching a new CBA.382
Last, the parties need to agree to keep confidential the
substance of each mediation session. To their detriment, both the
NFL’s management and the NFLPA have roused public concern
over this labor dispute by using the media to vilify one another and
gain support for their respective positions.383 As previously stated,
this has only heightened tensions between the parties and made
agreement more difficult.384
For good faith bargaining to occur and for mediation to be
effective, the parties must be able to engage in the mediation
process without having to worry that their words will be used
against them or misconstrued.385 Agreeing that the content of the
mediation sessions will be kept confidential virtually guarantees
that this will happen and allows the parties to have open and honest
negotiations.386 This, in turn, makes reaching a new CBA far more
likely.
CONCLUSION: THE POST GAME SHOW
It is time for the NFL’s management and the NFLPA to
demonstrate their commitment to reaching a new CBA. Properly
conducted mediation “promotes dignity and respect for [parties’]
interests, addresses the root cause of conflict, and allows for
resolutions that satisfy the interests of all parties. It is efficient,

381
382
383
384
385
386
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Mortensen, NFL-Union Talks Canceled, supra note 374.
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strengthens relationships of trust and respect, . . . and controls
unnecessary expenditure of resources.”387
In an organization where positive relationships are necessary
for owners and players to achieve success, conflict can be costly.388
Properly conducted mediation “creates the opportunity for conflict
to bring about productive outcomes,”389 and therefore, should play
an integral part in the NFL management’s and the NFLPA’s
collective bargaining process and in future labor disputes between
management and players in professional sports leagues. It is time
to huddle up.
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Wallace, supra note 306, at 71.
Id.
Id.

